戦時下政治における芸術家：名取洋之助-日本のリーフェンシュ タール？

Introduction
The ongoing discussion about whether such a thing as fascist aesthetics exists, and if so how it can be defined, was spurred by Susan Sontag's seminal article on "Fascinating fascism" (1975) in which actor, director, and photographer Leni Riefenstahl (1902Ϫ2003) serves as an example of such an aesthetic Ϫ an aesthetic informed by a fascist worldview that flowed through each phase and genre of her oeuvre like an undercurrent. 1 In her article, Sontag also elaborated on the problem of artists' political agency in the production of art within fascist or ultranationalist regimes; that is, the issues of agency and responsibility that Hannah Arendt examined in her controversial book Eichmann in Jerusalem (2006 Jerusalem ( [1963 ) and in her philosophical writings (2003) . Although Arendt did not particularly focus on aesthetics, her refutation of the apologetic trope of actors/collaborators as "cogs" in wartime state machinery (2003: 30) also provides the basis for discussing the question of artists' agency and responsibility. This paper examines the question of artists' wartime politics mainly through discussion of the writings of Natori Yōnosuke (1910Ϫ1962), a Japanese photographer, art director, and editor of various magazines, who Ϫ like Riefenstahl Ϫ had his professional roots in Weimar Germany, and became a prolific creator of propaganda during the Fifteen-Year War in Japan. 2 A detailed list of characteristics that define propaganda is provided by Thymian Bussemer (2008: 33Ϫ34) in his study on the scientific theories of propaganda. Bussemer defines propaganda as the media-led formation of opinions and attitudes in social or political groups via symbolic communication to create a public sphere for the benefit of particular interests. Complementarily, propaganda also features exaggerated or inflated self-images and deprecatory images of the "other", and subordinates truth to the instrumental criterion of efficiency, attempting to naturalize its messages and appeals for action (see Bussemer 2008: 33) . As symbolic communication, propaganda works through language and visuals. Photography used in propaganda production raises the problem of "photographic truth", that is, the connection of photography to its referents, the photographed objects. However, a photograph is "as much an interpretation of the world as paintings and drawings are" (Sontag 1979: 7) because it is at once polysemous and "a message without a code" (Barthes 1977: 19) . It is encoded with meaning via its framing technique, accompanying text, the political affiliation of the publication in which it appears Ϫ that is, the "channel of transmission" (1977: 15) Ϫ the situational context in which it is presented, and last but not least by the contingent experiences of the viewer. Thus, a photograph may be "true" and nonfalsified but its message is to a great extent coded by its context which Ϫ in propaganda Ϫ is subordinated clearly to specific political interests.
Thus defined, Natori's various activities after leaving Germany and relocating to Japan in 1933 until the end of World War II present a clear case of symbolic communication for propaganda purposes. These activities included producing the illustrated magazine NIPPON from 1934 until 1944, publishing photographs and albums on Japan, and developing his workshop Nippon Kōbō into a limited company with branches in occupied East and South East Asia with the aim of publishing a number of propaganda magazines financed mainly by the Imperial Army and the semi-governmental Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai ('Society for international cultural relations'), hereafter referred to as the KBS. After the war, until his death in 1962, Natori continued his career, as publisher of the illustrated magazine Shūkan San Nyūsu ('Weekly Sun News'), as lead editor of the 286 volumes of Iwanami Shashin Bunkō, as an award-winning photographer in 1953 and 1954, and as an influential photography critic. 3 The question of artists' political agency in wartime and recognition of wartime responsibility invite comparison between Natori and his contemporary, Riefenstahl, who was closely associated with the highest echelons of the Nazi leadership. However, while Riefenstahl was a well-known artist using the cutting-edge audiovisual media of her time, Natori and his work as a photographer, publisher, and designer (of magazines he had edited and created since 1934) was barely known to a wider public in wartime Japan. Both Riefenstahl and Natori worked in the field of visuals, and although the media they primarily used were different (Riefenstahl would gain a reputation as a photographer only after the war), they shared a debt to the Weimar avant-garde, in terms of visual culture, and a perfectionist zeal for rendering politics aesthetic (Benjamin 1968 (Benjamin [1934 : 241Ϫ242) and advancing the hegemonic usurping of power by authoritarian regimes in their respective countries during the growing militarism and totalitarianism from the 1930s until the end of World War II.
Instead of engaging in a theoretical discussion on Natori's and Riefenstahl's aesthetics or attempting to outline the inherent "fascism" of their artworks, this paper is concerned rather with the propagandistic "channels of transmission" in Nazi Germany and wartime Japan through which Natori published his works, and the ways in which he responded to and helped proliferate the "culture of fascism" (Tansman 2009) in interwar and wartime Japan. In reflecting upon Natori's German connections, this paper draws comparisons with Riefenstahl, 4 serving as an example of the complex and contested ways of coming to terms with the past. While Natori's agency in China and the question of wartime responsibility has already been discussed (Germer 2011 ) from a transnational and transcultural perspective, this paper focuses on his manifold German connections and professional activities. These ranged from Natori's friendship and cooperation with several Jewish colleagues of photojournalism, to the conceptual organization of cultural exchange between Japan and Nazi Germany on behalf of the KBS, photography for Nazi propaganda in Germany in the 1930s, as well as recommending Nazi visual propaganda strategies for Japan. This paper argues that Natori's agency needs to be approached not only in terms of Japanese but also of German wartime responsibility.
The beginning of a career at the end of Weimar Germany
In the book Shashin no yomikata ('How to Read Photographs'), a compilation of Natori's writings published posthumously in 1963, Natori called himself a furyō shōnen (i.e., 'a bad student') who was not admitted directly to post-secondary education and told to repeat the fifth year of middle school. But his parents suggested he study abroad instead (Natori 2004 (Natori [1962 : 98) and so he moved, together with his mother, to Berlin in 1928 to study German. At that time, from the mid1920s to the early 1930s, Berlin was a center for Japanese scholars and students in Europe, while Japanese artists generally preferred to study in Paris (Katō 2006: 126) . But when Natori, who had had plans to become an actor and, later, a painter, realized that he was not talented enough for either, he decided to study design at an arts and crafts school in Munich from 1929. At the time, the Bauhaus aesthetic of rational design was gaining prominence in crafts and industrial design and thus deeply influenced Natori's aesthetics. Soon he was employed as a designer at the weaving workshop of Siegmund von Weech (1888Ϫ 1982 , who was known not only for his weaving designs but also for designing stamps, coins, seals, and flags. Natori (2004 [1962] : 101) noted that what he later applied in his own company, Nippon Kōbō, in terms of layout and design, he had learned from his boss and friend. Von Weech seems to have been a role model for Natori in other ways, too, as von Weech is also known for one of the various designs of the Reichsadler, the national symbol of the Weimar Republic, as well as official prototypes for the seals of the National Socialist bureaucracy and the eagle in the seal of the Federal Republic of Germany (Funke 2009: Ch. 1.2) . In sum, von Weech's career serves as an example of the continuity of artistic production in the course and service of very different political regimes of pre-war, wartime, and post-war Germany.
Another friend of Natori's was Herman Landshoff (1905Ϫ1986), who was to become a famous fashion photographer in Paris and New York, and who Natori himself (2004 [1962] : 101) identified as the major influence in turning his interest to photography. At the time, Landshoff oversaw the layout at the Münchner Illustrierte Presse (MIP), but being Jewish he later had to flee to Paris when Hitler seized power, and then on to the United States in 1941.
5 Natori, together with his partner Erna Mecklenburg (1901Ϫ1979), 6 whom he had met in Munich in 1930 while she was working at a publishing firm, frequented Landshoff's house, where they learned how to use a dark room, and both of them formed the idea that they could make a living as photographers.
Germany at the time was a pioneer in the publications of so-called illustrated magazines, with publication numbers of several hundred thousand. Freelance photographers or their agents sold photographs to newspapers and magazines. The latest German-made compact cameras from Ermanox and Leica were light, easy to handle, and were capable of taking high-quality pictures, and thus greatly facilitated the emergence of photojournalism.
7 Natori equipped himself with the latest compact camera model, a 35-mm Leica, and, after an unsuccessful first attempt, sold a photo story by Erna Mecklenburg to the weekly MIP for 500 Marks (Natori 2004 [1962 : 102Ϫ103), the equivalent of one month's salary. It was Landshoff who had introduced Natori to the editor-in-chief of the MIP, Stefan Lorant (1901Ϫ1997) , another Jewish intellectual who had played a leading role in developing photojournalism among the photographers and editors of the German-language press since the late 1920s (Hallett 2005; Kerbs et al. 1983) . After Lorant was imprisoned by the Nazis for six and a half months in 1933 (Lorant 1939 (Lorant [1935 (Kishi 1974: 25Ϫ26) . In its planning stages, LIFE was shaped by the guiding expertise of Kurt Korff and his efforts to have Jewish refugees of the German photographic profession employed for the new magazine (Baughman 1987: 87) . 10 In his book Shashin no yomikata, Natori (2004 Natori ( [1962 : 21) declared that 'Hitler created LIFE ' (Hitorā "Raifu" o tsukuru) , meaning immigrant Jews from Germany were a major factor in the creation of the magazine. It is important to note that Natori was working for and with those people in Germany who were pivotal in the development of photojournalism, including Szafranski, Korff, and Lorant, whose dynamic style of photo essays would become models of the genre in France, England, and the United States in the 1930s. Natori also mentioned his acquaintance with other Jewish photographers affiliated with Ullstein, such as Erich Salomon (1886Ϫ1944), 11 one of the most famous press photographers of the time, who was later murdered in Auschwitz, and Martin Munkácsi (1896Ϫ1963), 12 who published fashion photography in the magazine Die Dame ('The Lady') and immigrated to the United States in 1934 (Natori 2004 (Natori [1962 : 127Ϫ128).
When sent to Japan by Ullstein Press in 1932 on a three-month assignment, Natori took approximately 7,000 photos on 30 themes. The photographs were used by Ullstein and distributed worldwide through Berlin-based Mauritius Schönbildverlag (Natori 2004 (Natori [1962 : 118Ϫ120), a photo agency whose Jewish owner, Ernst Mayer, was forced to emigrate and went on to found Black Star in 1936. The fate of his company is indicative of the segregation, successive exclusion, and expropriation of Jewish agents and photojournalists from German journalism from the beginning of Nazi rule (Sachsse 2000) .
After returning from Japan to Berlin, Natori was sent to Asia again, this time to cover the Kwantung Army between February and May 1933. While he was in Japan for a break, Ullstein informed him that it had become impossible for German media to employ "non-Aryan" staff, but they offered to retain his affiliation as a foreign correspondent. Since the Nazis had come to power, the regime of terror targeted journalists and photojournalists. A number of Jewish-owned photo agencies changed owners even before October 1933, when the new Editor's Law (Schriftleitergesetz) drafted by Joseph Goebbels was passed, stipulating in Paragraph 5.3 that only those "who are of Aryan decent, and are not married to a person of non-Aryan descent" were allowed to work as journalists. This law came into effect on 1 January 1934.
13 Financially independent, Natori declined Ullstein's offer to become a foreign correspondent and instead decided to establish his own business in Japan. Seemingly a victim of the racist policies of the Nazi regime, Natori would later become a beneficiary of the expulsion of Jewish photojournalist colleagues when he returned to Germany in 1936 to cover the Berlin Olympics. As Rolf Sachsse (2000: 272) pointed out, the persecution and exclusion of Jewish photojournalists marked the beginning of the rise of a number of non-Jewish photographers who filled the void that was created. The specific terminology of the final draft of the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935 had partially been in response to concerns raised by the German Foreign Office and to protests from Japanese government representatives who had warned of negative consequences for GermanϪJapanese relations should antiJapanese discrimination be part of the new legislation.
14 When the indeterminate term "non-Aryan" in the Race Laws was exchanged for the specific term "Jewish", it allowed the cooperation of non-Jewish, Japanese, and other photographers to be solicited Ϫ that is, photographers who later profited from the exodus of Jewish members of the profession.
At first, however, Natori stayed in Japan, and in 1933 founded the photography and graphic design workshop Nippon Kōbō ('Japan workshop') together with photographer Kimura Ihei (1901Ϫ1974), designer Hara Hiromu (1903Ϫ1986), photo and art critic Ina Nobuo (1898Ϫ 1978) , and producer and actor Okada Sōzō (1903Ϫ1983; stage name: Yamanouchi Hikaru). Natori was ardent in his wish to introduce photojournalism to Japan, convinced that "photos could tell a story like the pen, or even better than the pen, and could express thoughts" (Natori 2004 (Natori [1962 : 132). These were ideas that had originally been developed by Szafranski, Korff, Lorant, and others. The Japanese term hōdō shashin was Ina Nobuo's and Natori's direct translation of the German word Reportage-Photo (Iijima 2005: 44) . In March 1934, Nippon Kōbō's second exhibition opened at Kinokuniya at Ginza, an exhibition in which the group successfully introduced photojournalism to Japan. Nevertheless, the group disbanded within a year (Natori 2004 (Natori [1962 : 137), with Natori and Mecklenburg going on to establish the second Nippon Kōbō. Natori's background was certainly helpful in the establishment of both the first and second Nippon Kōbō: His family had been part of Japan's financial and business elite since the Meiji period. His father, Natori Wasaku (1872Ϫ1959), was both founder of the insurance company Teikoku Seimei and a former executive of the textile company Kanebo, and it had been his father's business contacts in Germany that had led Natori to choose it as a country in which to study. Moreover, Natori's mother was the daughter of Asabuki Eiji (1849Ϫ1918), a leading figure in the Mitsui Conglomerate during the Meiji and Taisho periods. All these company names would appear frequently in the advertising sections of NIPPON.
NIPPON and its German model
When Albert Theile visited Natori in Japan with a reference letter from Ullstein, 15 he brought with him the international magazine Die Bött-cherstrasse. Internationale Zeitschrift, 16 which he had edited in Bremen from 1928Ϫ1930. The magazine had been financed by the coffee industrialist Ludwig Roselius (1874Ϫ1943), who, through worldwide sales of his decaffeinated coffee, HAG, had become one of the wealthiest men in Germany. Roselius had asserted the need for propaganda early on and eagerly supported Hitler's rise to power, but was nonetheless rebuked by the dictator in 1936 (Schreiber 2006) . Die Böttcherstrasse became the model for Natori's new project, the illustrated magazine NIP-PON, which Ϫ published in English, German, French, and Spanish Ϫ was geared toward foreign audiences to advertise modern Japan, its culture, politics, and economic strength. A total of 41 issues of NIP-PON were published between 1934 and 1944, including five Japanese editions ( NIPPON Fukkokuban 2005) . Produced by a team at the second Nippon Kōbō, it was the product of Natori's absolute guidance, aesthetic judgment, and perfectionist authority. It was a masterpiece in its combination of modern photography, graphic design, and photojournalism. As art director of state-of-the-art propaganda productions, Natori is comparable to Riefenstahl, who acted as the directing authority over a team that produced her infamous propaganda films. The context for Natori's magazine was Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and its ensuing international isolation that it sought to remedy. As the war expanded in 1937 and 1941, the magazine further sought to justify, illustrate, and propagate Japan's expansionist policies.
Whereas most Japanese scholars and students who had studied in Berlin around the turn of the 1930s harbored democratic ideals, and some began to protest Japan's expansionism in Manchuria or, like the artist Yumeji Takehisa, helped Jews to flee from Germany (Katō 2006: 129Ϫ132) , Natori serves as a different example of the effects of the German cosmopolitan experience. As editor, art director, photographer, and producer of his own magazine, he was recognized by the Japanese government and military as an expert in state propaganda. Soliciting support mainly from Kanebo, Natori had sought state support from the beginning. The KBS had been established in April 1934 as an extra-governmental organization affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their cooperation intensified when, after the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Natori became an associate (shokutaku) of the KBS, and production costs of his photo albums on Japan were fully borne by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō), the Japanese Army and Navy (Rikukaigun), and the Information Committee (Jōhō Iinkai). There were even deliberations about making NIPPON the official organ of the KBS. However, it was also suggested that its propaganda value would be higher if the magazine continued as it was, resulting in the decision being postponed indefinitely (Shirayama 2005: 15) .
Natori never mentioned his German wife, mentor, and co-worker in his account of establishing Nippon Kōbō, although Ϫ as many of his staff and contemporaries attested Ϫ she was crucial to his artistic work. Iijima Minoru (2005: 36, 39) , editor of the first issue of NIPPON, wrote that Erna Mecklenburg was "the one who discovered Natori's talents and was his closest collaborator, at times even leading him. In other words, she was such an important person that she cannot be omitted from any account on Natori". Although a major force in the production of NIPPON, her name never appeared in the list of the magazine's editorial staff. Perhaps Mecklenburg was simply another of those women whose accomplishments (but also complicity) were "covered up" by the darkness that their husbands shed on their contributions, but it may also have been that Natori deemed a foreign name unfitting in a journal that should present a technologically modern but traditionally pure Japan.
Engaging with spectacle in Nazi Germany: Olympics and crafts exhibitions
In 1936, Natori and Mecklenburg returned to Germany to cover the Olympic Games and tour the country. They subsequently travelled to the United States, where they made a photographic tour of the country for LIFE magazine. In Germany, they were probably also working on the volume Grosses Japan 'Great Japan' (Natori 1937), produced by a German publisher in 1937. This volume, which collected photographs of various aspects of Japan (some of which were also published in NIP-PON), is seen as representative of Natori's photography. A second edition came out in 1942 under the decidedly imperialist title Gross-Japan 'Greater Japan' (Natori 1942). At the Berlin Olympics, the Nazi Party's greatest international propagandistic spectacle, Natori contributed photos to the Second Olympic Special Edition of BIZ which by that time was firmly in Nazi hands.
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As a "channel of transmission" for Nazi propaganda since 1934, BIZ formed the political context and provided the signifying field of Natori's photography. His panoramic view of the Olympic sports arena in Berlin (Figure 2 ) not only glorified Hitler in its caption, its relative position within the Special Edition also indicates its propagandistic value as it directly followed the first page which is a full-page photograph showing Hitler and members of the Olympic Committee descending the steps of the arena at the opening of the Games (Figure 1) .
For the KBS, Natori and Mecklenburg networked and organized Japanese shows at two exhibitions, hosted in Leipzig in March 1938 and in Berlin from May to July 1938. Even before GermanϪJapanese cultural relations were officially sealed by the GermanϪJapanese Cultural Agreement of 25 November 1938 and the establishment of the Deutsch-Japanischer Kulturausschuß ('GermanϪJapanese culture committee') on 3 April 1940, 18 Natori became the middleman between Nazi artisans' corporations and the KBS for the exhibition Japanische Gebrauchsgegenstände ('Japanese objects of everyday use') in Leipzig. 19 According to Mecklenburg, Natori conceptualized the exhibition as a "protest exhibition" that should counter the low image of Japanese products by demonstrating the high quality and aesthetic design of everyday objects and tools in Japan (cited in Shirayama 2005: 18). Considering the interwar move of German artisan associations to the radical right and to the Nazis (McKitrick 1996 (McKitrick : 404Ϫ405, 1998 , as well as the Blut und Boden ('blood and soil') ideology and anti-Semitism that went hand in hand with the expulsion of Jewish members from all crafts until they were eventually declared "free of Jews" (Sachsse 2000: 281) at the beginning of 1939, a Japanese exhibit in 1938 may have protested its own low image; at the same time, however, it confirmed and strengthened Nazi positions and policies. Natori was also the representative organizer of the Japanese exhibit at the Internationale Handwerks-Ausstellung ('International crafts exhibition'), a Nazi propaganda event held in Berlin from 28 May to 10 July 1938 in which 30 countries participated. In this exhibition, Natori succeeded in presenting Japanese crafts as highly developed, and his comments and photographs in the exhibition catalogue are, compared to the other international representations, notable for their style, functionality, and modern perspective (AMRB 1938: 68Ϫ73) . For example, the low angle and camera perspective in the artisan visual (Figures 3 and 4) create various diagonal and horizontal lines in the composition of the photograph Ϫ an illustration of the modern photographic trend of New Vision. Jewish assets. 20 At the exhibition, a quote from Prime Minister and president of the KBS, Konoe Fumimarō, was visually presented on a banner ( Figure 5 ) Ϫ the same quote also appears in his editorial for the special German issue of NIPPON (Figure 6 ) on the exhibition. Although Konoe was known for his reverence of Nazi politics and ideology, it is nevertheless remarkable that his quote in both form and content reads as if taken straight from a standard Nazi propaganda text: "In no other cultural form finds spirit and essence of a people (Volk) such an unambiguous and illustrative expression as in its crafts." (Konoe 1938: 4; also see Figure 5 ). Certainly, it was Natori's cross-cultural experience and his cooperation that had worked to bridge and translate Japanese politics into the scriptural design and ideological language of Nazi discourse. Natori later acknowledged that this "international" event was in fact geared to advertise Nazi politics and German crafts (Shirayama and Hori 2006: 59) .
"Propaganda lessons" from Nazi Germany
The recognition that Natori received as both an event organizer and first-rate photographer within Nazi-controlled media may have been an incentive for him to wholeheartedly advertise Nazi strategies concerning the photojournalistic profession. Upon his return from extensive travels in Germany and the United States, where he had also met old colleagues from his years in Munich and Berlin, he published an article in the magazine Serupan ('Serpent'), relating his impressions of the photographic developments and their political condition in both countries (Natori 1938) . In this article, Natori stressed that Hitler's ascent to power had "a decisive influence on the development of press photography in Germany such that it is now in a 'leading position worldwide '" (1938: 110) . Taking up the German Olympics in 1936 and the annual Nuremberg Rally, he wrote, "it is fortunate that the Nazi Party's functionaries have recognized the power of photographic propaganda (shashin senden) and understand its value" (1938: 112). He stressed that German politics had established a strong institutional framework for propaganda and that, in contrast to Japan, the authority and expertise of the photographic profession was fully recognized in Germany (1938: 112) . Indeed, it was the Editors' Law of 4 October 1933, drafted by Joseph Goebbels, that raised the status of photojournalism, which was declared a press-related profession to be distinguished from photography as a craft. However, the incorporation of photojournalists into the professional organization of journalists, the Reich Association of the German Press, made them subject to discriminatory state control as membership was assessed individually on the basis of a racial, political, and professional check (Weise 1983: 144Ϫ 145; Welch 2002: 193) . Thus, photographs that would provide an emphatic view on the horrors of persecution were for the most part eradicated, leaving a photographic profession that would selectively capture its objects from the angle of the perpetrators, the collaborators, the voyeurs and bystanders (Sachsse 2000: 281 ; with reference to Hilberg 1993). Natori's transcultural expertise and his transnational professional activities made him one of the collaborators, and he propagated this particular angle of cooperation with the state and its systematic proliferation in his own country: So the [German] government has brilliant photographers take pictures in all kinds of political movements and political gatherings and has this material put in order and streamlined (seiri tōitsu) under a firm regime. This is something that should be implemented as soon as possible in Japan, too. First, it should be undertaken by a wise decision of the Cabinet Information Bureau. It is hopelessly outdated to leave all kinds of official records simply as texts and to treat dry and black commemorative photographs as [purely] additional things. I think that official records should all be left as texts and as photographs. In the recent China Incident the need for propaganda photography (hōdō senden shashin) has been recognized and photographers fulfil their important duty in the rain of bullets, which is believed to bring extraordinary progress to the field of photojournalism. As was the case with the China Incident, there has not been much debate about the need for propaganda photography that targets domestic and foreign audiences (tainai taigai senden hōdō shashin) but I think we should take this as an opportunity and take photographs that record the political directions by the hands of the government, which should furthermore also deal with [all kinds of pictures] from photos of industry and technology to photos of amusement and sports. These photos will later serve various purposes. It goes without saying that propaganda photography that targets an international audience (taigai senden shashin) is seen as very important in Germany, but the Ministry of Propaganda provides active guidance and support also with regards to the method of its distribution. Both are desirable for our country as well. (Natori 1938: 112) Thus, Natori took the Nazi regime's directing, controlling, and supporting role of photojournalism as the model for Japan to follow. In doing this, he hoped to enhance the use and the standing of photography by elevating its position as a tool to document state affairs for history. He also aimed to enhance the standing of photography as a profession when he exalted the duty that photographers fulfilled for the nation state "in the rain of bullets", thus placing them on the same level as soldiers risking their lives for the state. Indeed, returning from the United States after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Natori flew straight to Shanghai and, later that year, managed to strike a deal with the Shanghai Expeditionary Army whereby three Nippon Kōbō staff members would serve as photographers for the Army Press Unit (Nakanishi 1980: 231) . In Germany, the Wehrmacht and the Ministry of Propaganda had experimented with military propaganda troops (Propagandakompanien), employing photogra-phers and journalists for psychological warfare since 1936. They officially established the first unit in September 1938, rapidly increasing the number of such troops and immediately training them for the soonto-come invasion of the Sudetenland (Uziel 2010: 17) .
Natori was aware of the possibility of fabrications inherent in the medium of photography and actively advertised the opportunity to "record political directions by the hands of the government", suggesting that German institution-building strategies be emulated in Japan and a Ministry of Propaganda be established that could streamline and control the whole profession of photography and journalism. When asserting the usefulness of all kinds of photographs for propaganda, "from photos of industry and technology to photos of amusement and sports", he conveyed nothing short of Goebbels's own ideas on propaganda, ideas that culminated in a comprehensive system of information control. Conceptualized like this, popular media and seemingly nonpolitical popular culture that met the tastes of mass audiences were used to stabilize the political system, resulting in what Bussemer (2005: 55) called a 'propagandistically interspersed popular culture'.
In his Serupan article, Natori also noted that the development of photojournalism in the United States had made significant progress in the previous two to three years, reasons for this being that "photographers and other experts of illustrated magazines [...] who were discontented with Hitler's revolution left Germany and went to liberalistic America and brought with them their ample experience in photojournalism and in the publication of illustrated magazines" (Natori 1938: 112; emphasis mine). What is noteworthy in Natori's choice of wording is that even though he was personally acquainted with most of the German and Hungarian Jewish emigrants he mentions (i.e., Landshoff, Szafranski, Korff, Lorant), he conveyed their decision to leave Germany as being the result of their discontentment and thus implicitly as an act of free choice. In 1936, when the last news agencies of Jewish ownership had closed and the Olympic Games had ended, all Jewish members were excluded from the photojournalist profession in Germany (Sachsse 2000: 274) . Natori's former boss, Lorant, wrote in 1935, not long after his release from a Nazi prison in 1933, Calm, peace and order reigned. And yet, a few yards away, hundreds, thousands of innocent people were locked up in cells, a few yards away from the peaceful scene before me the victims of National Socialism were torturing themselves and being tortured. I see now how it is that travellers from abroad can write of Germany: "There is perfect order here". They are only allowed to see the surface of things. Which of them has any knowledge of the life in the concentration camps, in the prisons or in the barracks of the S.A.. (Lorant 1939 (Lorant [1935 : 277) However, Natori was certainly not a tourist in Germany. He had a German wife and thus German family; he had been raised in his profession in Germany, contributed to the Nazi press, and participated in international exhibitions of Nazi Germany. It seems unlikely that he should not have had any knowledge of what happened to his former friends, colleagues, and bosses, who Ϫ by the time Natori returned to Germany between 1936 and 1937 and wrote his forceful proposal to emulate the Nazi system of propaganda (Natori 1938) Ϫ had already fled Germany and written about their life-threatening experiences at the hands of the Nazis Ϫ in the case of Lorant, in a book that was already in its fifth reprint by 1936.
Natori certainly knew what would appeal to a foreign, Western audience, and what would serve the need for a modern visual and effective aesthetic presentation of Japan and its colonies. With the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, he advanced the propagandistic scheme of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He relocated to China and fervently pursued black propaganda against Chiang Kai-shek, founding cultural magazines produced in Japan and financed by the Japanese Army, but made to look as if they were produced in China by a private Chinese press and Chinese editors (see Germer 2011; Nakanishi 1980 Nakanishi , 1981 Shirayama and Hori 2006) . Financed by the Army and the KBS, Nippon Kōbō was renamed and restructured in 1939 to become a corporation, the Kokusai Hōdō Kōgei Kabushiki Kaisha. With its head office in Tokyo and with branches in Ōsaka, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, and Shinkyō (today's Changchun) in 1940, 21 the company became a major organization for the production of state propaganda in the East Asian colonies (Koyanagi and Ishikawa 1993: 146) .
In his book Shashin no yomikata, Natori (2004 Natori ( [1962 : 71) cautioned against creating stories and lies via willfully created photographic sequencing, adding that the one who had best understood and applied this rule was Hitler. Of course, Hitler himself had asserted the need and importance of propaganda early on, as he had elaborated in two chapters of Mein Kampf, believing that propaganda had played a crucial part in the defeat of the German Empire in the First World War (Welch 2002: 10Ϫ11) . However, as outlined above, Natori's proposal to emulate Nazi propaganda rather reflected Goebbels's ideas to control the public sphere less by political slogans than by diffusing a 'propagandistically interspersed popular culture' (Bussemer 2005: 55) , as well as Goebbels's successful utilization of popular, and to some extent avant-garde, culture for propagandistic means (2005: 53).
Conclusion: comparative and transnational dimensions of wartime responsibility
In post-war Japan, Natori engaged briefly with television, designing a show (among other things) which, under the title Heika to tomo ni ('With our Majesty'), introduced art and cultural heritage outside the metropolis, with the underlying rationale that the Emperor would serve to draw Japanese viewers to the show (Mikami 2005 (Mikami [1992 : 444). Employing the concept of the Emperor as a sales point is another example of Natori's peculiar and conceptual combination of art with nationalistic and marketing strategies. This move from photography to film/TV documentary is an interesting twist when compared to Riefenstahl, who made the opposite move in her post-war career.
In terms of cooperation with totalitarian or ultranationalist goals and later rejection of political responsibility by articulately covering up the silence on one's wartime agency through continuing engagement with mass media or abstract theory, Natori's case raises similar issues as Riefenstahl's with regards to artists' political agency and the denial of wartime responsibility. Horst Bredekamp (2007: 8) characterized Riefenstahl as 'the eye of the National Socialists and at the same time an inheritor of the avant-garde'. Natori, too, was a talented student of the photographic avant-garde in Germany and an eager emulator of Nazi propaganda strategies, an emulator who at the time of the Berlin Olympics contributed directly to the Nazi press, and from the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, initiated black propaganda in East Asia. In post-war Japan, he chose silence and photographic theory to cover up his previous political agency.
The gradual rehabilitation of wartime artists that Sontag lamented in her (1975) article on Riefenstahl also happened in Japan, where a Riefenstahl photography exhibition in Tokyo's Seibu Museum of Art in 1980 on the African Nuba was explicitly designed as an homage to the former film maker. According to designer and curator Ishioka Eiko, the aim of the exhibition was not to criticize but to celebrate Riefenstahl. 22 Some researchers suggest that it was Riefenstahl's unrepentant attitude and self-promotion in the post-war period (Majer-O'Sickey 2008: 266) and her lies in the face of facts that sustained her controversial celebrity until her death at the age of 101 (Glasenapp 2009: 9; Kansteiner 2008: 121) . Natori, by contrast, was never seriously challenged during his lifetime, a life that lasted only about half of Riefenstahl's; he remained a celebrity in the professional circles that he had helped to create throughout the rest of his life and even beyond.
Of course, photojournalist careers such as Natori's, and the lack of reflection on individual cooperation with the regime, are said to be rather common in Germany as well, be it in East or West Germany.
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Several former BIZ photojournalists went on to work in Propaganda Units and were pivotal to the success of the German propaganda magazine Signal, launched in 1940. 24 It was individual political agents and leaders in the field of propaganda, such as Eichmann and Riefenstahl, who triggered discussions of wartime responsibility. As for Eichmann, Arendt attested that it was his mediocrity and lack of judgment that made him do what he did, but she nevertheless rejected the image of a "cog in the machinery" that Eichmann and his defence brought forth to clear him of the charges made against him. Although very different in scope, a similar strategy can be discerned with some of Natori's biographers, who either privatize his responsibility by arguing that only Natori in his heart would have to come to terms with his wartime politics (Ishikawa 1991: 243) , or assert that he was involuntarily made to contribute to the machinery of wartime propaganda when "the whole of Japan was swallowed in the great wave of war" (Iizawa 1998: 5) . Noting critically that "where all are guilty, no one is", Arendt (2003: 21) has pointed out the curious reluctance to make judgments in terms of individual responsibility when it comes to people who cooperated or actively promoted the criminal politics of German National Socialism (Arendt 2003 (Arendt : 19Ϫ20, 2006 (Arendt [1963 : 297).
Natori's travels to Germany and his photographic work at the time of the 1936 Olympics have recently been published in a newly compiled album by the publisher Iwanami, marketing the "rediscovery" of Natori and his photography in the cover text as follows: "From negatives that were left behind 70 years ago we can now vividly re-live these journalistic photographs that overflow with feelings of youth and speed." (Natori 2006: cover text) . As this sentence suggests, the album provides for the most part nostalgic reflections; it neither enhances our understanding of the time and events it focuses on Ϫ the 1936 Olympics were crucial for the propaganda of Hitler's Germany Ϫ nor does it reflect on Natori's role. By celebrating a photo album of the 1936 Olympics without providing a critical view on the regime's underside of state terrorism, and by placing aesthetics, nostalgia, and national pride at the center of a marketing strategy (the Japanese Olympic team and its successes are portrayed in detail in the book), Iwanami repeats what Natori successfully practiced all his life. What is missing is any investigation of the political implications of Natori's photographic practice at the time. Instead, what readers get is a brief reminiscing account by another Japanese press photographer at the Berlin Olympics of the unscrupulous deception that Natori employed when it came to outdoing a competitor in the business (Kanamaru in Natori 2006: 2Ϫ3) , and a commentary (Shirayama in Natori 2006: 119) that identifies Na-tori as an informed onlooker rather than an active agent in the politics of his own country's scheme of foreign propaganda.
In 2005, the Japan Professional Photographers Society (Nihon Shashin Kyōkai) established an award for young photographers under 30 years of age that bears Natori's name (Tanuma 2005) . Despite an alleged shift in acceptance of Riefenstahl exhibitions (Majer-O'Sickey 2008; Sontag 1975) , it would be difficult to fathom a "Riefenstahl Award" in Germany. Moreover, announcing the establishment of the Natori award, the chairman of the Photographers Society, Tanuma Takeyoshi (2005) , also called for the preservation of the vast numbers of plates that photographers took of Japanese society during the war, but he failed to mention the photographic evidence produced in occupied East Asia. This omission forecloses a critical examination but suggests the same kind of nostalgia that Iwanami's Natori album on Germany in 1936 displays.
While critical scholarship on Japan's wartime past was in sway during the first two post-war decades and declined thereafter (Conrad 1999) , sociocultural conditions in Germany allowed the silence surrounding the Nazi past to be challenged critically and comprehensively only from the 1960s onward (Frei 2011: 106Ϫ108) . Therefore, the reasons for different academic approaches and societal attitudes must be sought less in the difference of the wartime experience but rather in the politics of science/knowledge in each country and in each phase since then.
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While Riefenstahl Ϫ irrespective of the questions of facts, lies, and truth Ϫ has served as a major platform in coming to terms with the past for several political generations who have continued to use her to project their interpretations of Nazism (Kansteiner 2008: 122) , Natori Yōnosuke, it seems, has yet to become such a projection screen for questioning Japanese imperialism, colonialism, and ultra-nationalism. As a modern, cosmopolitan artist, his case also serves to underscore and draw our attention to the complex transnational and transcultural dimensions of individual wartime agency and responsibility.
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10. See Kerbs et al. (1983) and Gidal (1972) Sachsse (2000: 274) . For an English translation of the law, see Welch (2002: 191Ϫ193) . 14. Japanese Ambassador Mushanokōji Kintomo in a meeting with Foreign Minister Constantin von Neurath on 6 May 1935, cited in Conze et al. (2010: 104, 727 Koltermann (2009: 84Ϫ85) . For a discussion of Japanese images and art exhibitions in Nazi Germany, see Leims (1990) . 18. Natori selected 400 objects of arts and crafts that were sent to Germany for the exhibition in Leipzig in 1938 (Shirayama 2005: 18; Shirayama and Hori 2006: 58) . 19. Funk (1890Ϫ1960) was Minister for Economy of the Reich and of Prussia from 1938. He was a major figure in the schemes to exclude the Jewish population from economic activities, to disown them, and to transfer the financial assets of murdered Jews in the National Bank (Reichsbank) into the account of the SS (Klee 2010: 172) . 20. In 1934, Ullstein had been forced to sell itself for 10% of its market value to the Cautio GmbH, behind which stood Rolf Rienhardt (1903Ϫ1975), one of the most important strategists of the Nazi press; BIZ was published until 1945 (http://www.preussen-chronik.de/begriff_jsp/key=begriff_berlinerCillustrirteC zeitung.html). 21. See Nobuta (2005: 60) and Koyanagi and Ishikawa (1993: 146) . For visuals and brief descriptions of the various magazines that his company produced, see the exhibition catalogue by Shirayama and Hori (2006) ; for listings of the magazines, see also the tables in Ishikawa (1991: 252Ϫ253) , Nakanishi (1981: 126Ϫ127) , and Shirayama and Ishii (1998: 68Ϫ69) . 22. Quoted in Leni Riefenstahl-Rezeption nach 1945 (http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.
de/riefenstahl/n_ausstellungen_einzelne_ausstellungen.shtml). 23. See Hartewig (2010: 55) , Rutz (2007: 148Ϫ163) , and Uziel (2010) for a number of photographers in the Wehrmacht's propaganda units, some of whom, at the end of the war, became photojournalists for the Allied Forces (such as Hanns Hubmann), and subsequently held major positions in post-war German illus-trated magazines. Arendt (2003: 55) criticized the incomplete de-Nazification by the Allies and by the immediate post-war German government, an assessment that is confirmed by a recent study on the Foreign Office (Conze et al. 2010 ). However, some prominent cases of journalists who were purged in later years (such as Werner Höfer) in Germany are remarkable, and the continuing proliferation of critical studies on Nazism and prominent figures in German wartime and post-war public life has been a marked feature of German academic and non-academic research since the 1960s. 24. See Rutz (2007) on this illustrated propaganda magazine that targeted foreign audiences until 1945. Natori's NIPPON can be seen as an early forerunner of this kind of magazine, even though it is nowhere acknowledged as a model for Signal. 25. A recent publication reflects on the different ways that the wartime past has been examined and acknowledged in both countries (Satō and Frei 2011) . While it is true that both countries' wartime responsibilities are different in nature and scope when considering the Holocaust and the subjugation of East Asia, they are at the same time interlocked not only in obvious political ways, such as the Tripartite Pact or through cultural diplomacy of which Natori was an agent, but perhaps in indirect entangled ways that still need to be examined. Kim Hoi-eun (German History 2010: 526) pointed to the trajectories of German medical science and anthropology, particularly in Japan, and to their redeployment by the Japanese in the overseas empire, noting the possible connections of the medical experiments of Units such as Unit 731 in Manchuria with the Nazis' medical experiments and euthanasia program known under the code name "Aktion T4".
